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1. MotivationComputer systems require sophistiated seurity, best attained when akey or password is shared between several people in suh a way that it anonly be reonstruted by a suÆiently large and responsible group atingin agreement. Shared seurity systems are used in banks, in other nanialinstitutions, in ommuniations networks and in omputing systems servingeduational institutions, though the best-known examples are military: forinstane, in the ativation of nulear weapons or missiles, several oÆersmust onur fully before the neessary password an be reonstruted.Shemes for determining the distribution of the partial information tothe people involved are known as seret sharing shemes or aess shemes,and lead to shared ontrol. The piees of partial information whih aredistributed are known as shares and may be of equal value (as in the mili-tary examples mentioned above) or more often of unequal value, probablyarranged aording to a hierarhy of some kind. For example in a universityomputing system, shares whih lead to the reonstrution of the systemmanager's or superuser's key are far more valuable than those whih leadonly to a student's key.Seret sharing shemes have often been based on onstrutions from -nite geometries [?℄, numerial linear algebra [?℄, the theory of error-orretingodes [?℄ and, more reently, design theory [?℄. A geometri example is easyto visualise. Suppose that the seret is the ombination of a safe, and thatit onsists of three digits, xyz: We ould share the seret between a groupof n people by giving eah of them the equation of a plane through thepoint (x; y; z): If we hoose the planes so that their pairwise intersetions give distintlines through (x; y; z); then any two people an together determine aline through the point and any three an determine the point itself,and hene the ombination of the lok. This is an example of a (3; n)threshold sheme with threshold three, meaning that any three of then shares determine the seret, but no two shares determine it. Suppose, on the other hand, we hoose the planes so that all butone of them have a line, l, say, in ommon, and the remaining plane,P , intersets l in the point (x; y; z): Then nding the point requiresknowledge of the plane P and any two other planes. This means2
that the agreement of the person who knows P is essential for thedetermination of the seret, and the sheme is not just a thresholdsheme.Situations where shares of unequal value are used arise often in pra-tie. For example, onsider the authorisation of eletroni transfer of largeamounts of money between nanial institutions. One might expet, say,that two vie-presidents ould jointly authorise the transfer of amountsover $10000 000, two junior vie-presidents amounts between $1 000000and $10000 000, two senior tellers amounts between $100000 and $1 000000and two tellers lesser amounts. This is in a situation where the appropri-ate password is never revealed outside the eletroni faility (in the bank'shead oÆe) whih reonstruts the password from the information sharesfed into it. What if a vie-president and a junior vie-president are delayedin another ity by airport fog?An obvious solution is to share the authorisation ode for transfer oflarger amounts of money between larger numbers of more junior sta, butdoing this eÆiently presents a problem. At present, many aess shemesare known and some of them, based on ombinatorial designs and nitegeometries, have been proved to be the best possible (in a theoretial sense).2. DesignsA ombinatorial design is a way of seleting, from a nite set, X , aolletion of b subsets whih meets ertain requirements. These b subsetsare usually referred to as the bloks of the design. If all the bloks ontainthe same number, k, of elements and if all the v elements of the underlyingset X our in the same number, r, of bloks, the design is said to be ablok design. Counting the elements in the design shows that vr = bk:A blok design in whih all pairs of elements our equally often, say times, is said to be balaned; ounting pairs of elements in the design showsthat (v   1) = r(k   1): Suh a design is often referred to as a 2{(v; k; )design sine the parameters b and r an be alulated from v; k and : Inpartiular, a 2-(v; 3; 1) design is alled a Steiner triple system, often denotedby STS(v): In this paper we are onerned only with simple designs, thatis, those in whih no blok is repeated.As an example, suppose it is required to selet from a given set, X;subsets (bloks) ontaining three elements eah, and to selet them in suh3
a way that any pair of elements ours in preisely one blok. Thus if westart with the nine-element set X = f1; 2; 3; 4; 5; 6; 7; 8; 9g; then theolletion of 12 bloks in any olumn Di of Table 1 fulls our requirements,forming an STS(9): The boldfae numbers in the leftmost olumn indiatethe blok numbers in eah design. The horizontal lines indiate the parti-tion of the set of bloks of eah design into four olletions of three pairwisedisjoint bloks eah, that is, into four parallel lasses of bloks whih par-tition the set X: What is more, it an be shown that every STS(9) hasessentially the same struture as eah Di:# D1 D2 D3 D4 D5 D6 D71 123 124 125 126 127 128 1292 456 389 378 359 368 347 3673 789 567 469 478 459 569 4584 147 137 139 138 134 136 1355 258 259 268 245 269 257 2476 369 468 457 679 578 489 6897 159 158 148 149 156 145 1468 267 236 279 237 248 239 2389 348 479 356 568 379 678 57910 168 169 167 157 189 179 17811 249 278 234 289 235 246 25612 357 345 589 346 467 358 349Table 1: Large set of 2-(9; 3; 1) designsWe note that the seven olumns of Table 1 give a partition of the setof all  93 triples hosen from the set X into pairwise disjoint 2-(9; 3; 1)designs. Suh a partition is known as a large set of designs and exists forall STS(v) for v 6= 7 [?, ?℄. It has been proposed by Stinson and Vanstone[?℄ as a foundation on whih to onstrut a threshold sheme. Suppose forinstane that the seret key is 5 and that it is to be shared among threepeople. Then they ould be given the shares 1, 8 and 9 respetively, thekey being the number of the design in whih the blok 189 appears. Eahelement ours four times in eah design, so knowing that the design hasbloks ontaining the element `1' is of no advantage to an individual tryingto guess the key. Similarly, sine eah pair ours one in eah design,4
knowing that the design has a blok ontaining, say, the pair `18' is of noadvantage to a pair of shareholders trying to guess the key. But the set ofthree shares uniquely identies the design. Sine this is true in general, wehave a (3; 3) threshold sheme.Now we onentrate on the design labelled D1; and more formally, wewriteD1 = (X;B1); where B1 is the set of bloks of the design. Some subsetsof the set B1 have speial properties. The set of bloks S(4) = f1;2;4;5gan be ompleted to a 2-(9; 3; 1) design in only one way, namely to D1: Thesame is true of the set S(5) = f1;4;5;7;11g: Eah of these sets is said tobe a dening set of the design D1 and, sine no proper subset of either setdenes D1 uniquely, eah of them is a minimal dening set.On the other hand, the set of bloks R = f1;2;5;7g an be ompletedto an STS(9) in two ways, by adjoining the bloks f3;12g; together witheither T = f147; 168; 249; 267; 348; 369gto give the design D1 as before, orT 0 = f148; 167; 247; 269; 349; 368gto give a new design D01: Then T and T 0 form a trade in the design; thatis, the set of bloks T an be removed from the design D1 and replaed bythe set T 0 to give a dierent design with the same parameters. Sine nosubset of T an be traded to give an STS(9); they form a minimal trade.Every dening set and every trade within a design must have at leastone ommon blok, and the automorphism group of a dening set is asubgroup of the automorphism group of the design; see K Gray [?, ?, ?℄.These properties have been essential in the development of algorithms fornding minimal dening sets; see Greenhill [?℄, Delaney [?℄. In ndingfast algorithms that omplete a design from a given partial design, blokintersetion patterns have been important, espeially linkage; see Ramsay[?℄, Utami [?℄, Lawrene [?℄.3. Seret Sharing ShemesWe are studying the problem of ompletion of strutures, given partialinformation, to obtain measures of how losely the behaviour of a seretsharing sheme approahes to ideal behaviour in pratie. This allows om-parison of the information ontent of the partial struture with that of the5
omplete struture [?℄. In partiular if the partial struture an be uniquelyompleted then it, together with the rules for ompletion, ontains the sameinformation as the entire struture.Even for small orders the number of inequivalent ombinatorial designsgrows extremely rapidly. Here this feature beomes a strength, sine thehoie of parameters for whih there are a very large number of inequivalentdesigns makes the seret sharing sheme more seure.As our model, we take a situation in whih the group of partiipantsinludes a dealer (or trusted authority), as well as the shareholders. In the distribution phase, the dealer hooses a 2-(v; k; ) design,with suitable parameters, for whih a (preferably minimal) deningset is known. A permutation is applied to the set of elements underly-ing the design, thus relabelling the elements of eah blokto hide anystrutural information. Eah partiipant (exept the dealer) is givena suitable size share, onsisting of one or more whole bloks. Notethat no shareholder needs to know the parameters of the design. In the ombination phase, eah shareholder presents the givenshare to the ombiner, who ompletes the design and hene deter-mines the key, by using the shares, the permutation, the parametersv; k and ; the rules for ompletion and an algorithm for omple-tion. In the sheme we are proposing, the key will be ontained inthe strongbox or part of the design most diÆult to reonstrut frompartial information; the strongbox is dened formally in Setion 4.If a unique design is reonstruted, then eah shareholder an feel on-dent that the others are who they say they are (a matter of mutual au-thentiation) and that the seret is as intended. If the design annot bereonstruted, then either someone has made a mistake or someone is try-ing to heat. How easily an an unauthorised group of shareholders heat?In an ideal situation, we assume that no shareholder knows any of thefollowing:[A1℄ parameters of the design;[A2℄ size of the dening set being used;[A3℄ the permutation being applied to the elements.6
But if there is any suspiion of heating, it is prudent to assume that theoalition of heaters know all of the following:[C1℄ parameters of the design;[C2℄ whih of the inequivalent designs is being used;[C3℄ whih of the inequivalent permutations is being used;[C4℄ all but one of the shares, and if the shares have varyingproperties, that the missing share is one of those with the leastpower.We also always assume that an opponent has unlimited resoures toattak the sheme. In the next setion, we look at several small examplesof designs and see what an be disovered about them when only part of adening set is known.4. Partial Dening Sets of DesignsA minimal dening set, S, of a design D provides a small amount ofdata from whih D an be reonstruted uniquely. Analogous subsets ofLatin squares are alled ritial. These were rst studied in onnetionwith a problem at Rothamsted Experimental Station; see Nelder [?℄. Anyombinatorial strutures whih have rules for ompletion may be used toonstrut seret sharing shemes.In partiular we are onerned here with the problem of uniquely om-pleting a 2-(v; k; ) blok design given a proper subset of its set of bloks B:This is of interest in omparing the information ontent of the partial datawith that of the whole design. A proper subset of B whih an be uniquelyompleted must, together with the rules for ompletion, ontain the sameinformation as the whole design.We study the information inherent in proper subsets of B ompletableto at least two distint designs, and in the minimal dening sets of suhdesigns. Our approah is related to that of Fitina, Seberry and Chaudhry[?℄ for Latin squares.Let S be a dening set of a design D = (X;B) and let B 2 B be ablok of S: We make the following denitions, using the term `olletion',as oppposed to `set', when repeated objets may our. However in oursmall examples multiple bloks and multiple partial bloks do not arise.7
Nest: N (S; B); the nest of B in S; is the set of bloks of S nfBg; togetherwith all the omplete and partial bloks fored by the presene ofS n fBg: More preisely, we writeN (S; B) = (S n fBg) [N 0 [N 00where N 0 and N 00 are, respetively, the olletion of omplete bloksfored by SnfBg; and the olletion of partial bloks fored by SnfBgexluding those partial bloks of t or fewer elements sine these arealready fored by the parameters of the design.Power: P(S; B); the power of B in S; is the number of ompletions ofS n fBg to a design with the parameters of D.Inuene: I(S; B); the inuene of B in S; is the number of ompletebloks in the design D whih are not fored when the rules for om-pletion are applied to S n fBg:Strongbox: S(S); the strongbox of S; is the set of omplete bloks of Bnot ontained in the nest of any blok of S; that is, the set of blokswhih annot be found from any proper subset of the minimal deningset S of D:In order to test the suitability of a dening set S to be used for a seretsharing sheme we need to assess how easy it is for an attaker to guess thedesign from partial information.We onsider three small examples, eah with t = 2: In Example 1,t = k   1; in Examples 2 and 3, t < k   1: In Examples 1 and 2,  = 1; inExample 3,  = 2: In Example 1, the smallest dening set (4 bloks) has astrongbox of 6 bloks but the other minimal dening set (5 bloks) has astrongbox of only one blok. In Example 2, the two smallest dening setshave six bloks eah, but one has a strongbox of three bloks and the otherof only one blok. In Example 3, the two smallest dening sets have vebloks eah and eah has a strongbox onsisting of one blok.We note that the designs of Examples 1 and 2 are related, in that therst is a residual of the seond. However we have been unable to relate thebehaviour of their dening sets. 8
Example 1Suppose we wish to rereate the 2-(9; 3; 1) design D1; given that the pa-rameters are known, from one of the minimal dening sets S(4) and S(5):This is the aÆne plane of order 3.Table 2 shows the bloks of S(4); the triples in their nests, and the pairsstill required to omplete the design, where (x) denotes the set of pairsovered by the blok x: Eah blok in S(4) has power 4, and inuene 8.Thus knowing three of the four bloks in the dening set gives a 1 in 4hane of nding the orret design. The strongbox of S(4) is S(S(4)) =f7;8;9;10;11;12g: This shows the possibility of having a strongbox biggerthan the original dening set.B N 0(S(4); B) N 00(S(4); B) Pairs still needed1 6 ; (1;3;7;8;9;10;11;12)2 6 ; (2;3;7;8;9;10;11;12)4 3 ; (4;6;7;8;9;10;11;12)5 3 ; (5;6;7;8;9;10;11;12)Table 2: Properties of S(4) in design D1Table 3 shows the analogous information for S(5); using the notation(x) as before. Eah blok in S(5) has power 2, and inuene 6. Thusknowing four of the ve bloks in the dening set gives a 1 in 2 hane ofnding the orret design. The strongbox of S(5) is S(S(5)) = f2g: Sine 2onsists of the elements 4,5,6, this might for example be used to store theombination of a lok.B N 0(S(5); B) N 00(S(5); B) Pairs still needed1 3, 6 ; (1;2;8;9;10;12)4 8, 9 ; (2;3;4;6;10;12)5 10, 12 ; (2;3;5;6;8;9)7 6, 8 ; (2;3;7;9;10;12)11 6, 10 ; (2;3;8;9;11;12)Table 3: Properties of S(5) in design D19
No seret sharing sheme in whih a blok of a design is given to ashareholder is perfet. For example, on a given set of 9 elements, there are840 2-(9,3,1) designs, but if one blok is speied, only 120 of these arepossible. The strongbox tells us the portion of the design with regard towhih the sheme is onditionally perfet.In this example, t = k   1; so the maximal partial bloks fored by thesubsets of minimal dening sets are always t-sets, that is, in this ase, pairs.Thus N 00 = ;: Also, sine  = 1; N 0 is always a set.Example 2Consider the 2-(13; 4; 1) design, unique to isomorphism; this is the proje-tive plane of order 3, isomorphi to an extension of D1: The quarti residuesmodulo 13, together with 0, form a starter blok for the design P ; that is,P = f0; 1; 3; 9g is taken as the rst blok, and the remaining bloks formedby addition modulo 13. Letting A, B, C respetively denote 10, 11, 12,we have 1 = P; 2 = P + 1 = 124A; 3 = P + 2 = 235B and so on, till0 = P + C = C028: This design is symmetri; that is, it has b = v andonsequently also r = k: Its smallest dening sets have 6 bloks eah [?℄.B N 0(S(); B) N 00(S(); B) K2;91 9,A 1B0 n 0;78C n 7 (0,7; 1,2,3,6,8,9,A,B,C)2 8,A 270 n 2;9BC n B (2,B; 1,4,6,7,8,9,A,C,0)3 9,C 370 n 2;8AB n A (2,A; 3,5,6,7,8,9,B,C,0)4 A,C 47B n 6;890 n 8 (6,8; 2,3,4,7,9,A,B,C,0)5 8,C 5B0 n 0;79A n 9 (9,0; 2,4,5,6,7,8,A,B,C)6 8,9 67B n 6;AC0 n C (6,C; 1,2,5,7,8,9,A,B,0)Table 4: Properties of S() in design PIn a 2-(v; k; 1) design, the set of all the bloks whih do not ontain somexed element form a dening set [?℄. In this partiular ase, six of the ninesuh bloks form a smallest dening set, suh as S(8) = f1;2;3;4;5;7gwhih omits the element 8. The only other smallest dening set is isomor-phi to S() = f1;2;3;4;5;6g onsisting of six onseutive bloks.Table 4 shows the bloks of S(); the bloks and partial bloks in theirnests, and the pairs still needed in the ompletion to a design with the10
parameters of P : In desribing triples in the nest of blok 1, for instane,we use the notation 1B0 n 0 to mean that from eah of the bloks 1, Band 0, we delete the element 0, leaving the triples 139, 6AB and 28C inN 00(S();1): The rightmost olumn shows the pairs still needed; sine theyhappen to form a opy of the omplete bipartite graph K2;9 we show onlythe labels of the two parts of this graph. Eah blok of this dening sethas power 2 and inuene 6, and the strongbox onsists of three bloks,S(S()) = f7;B;0g:B N 0(S(8); B) N 00(S(8); B) K2;91 9,0 16C n 1;8AB n A (1,A; 3,5,6,7,8,9,B,C,0)2 8,C 690 n 8;2AB n A (8,A; 1,2,4,5,6,9,B,C,0)3 9,A 680 n 8;3BC n B (8,B; 1,2,3,5,6,7,A,C,0)4 B,0 689 n 8;4AC n C (8,C; 1,3,4,5,6,7,9,A,B)5 8,0 56A n 5;9BC n B (9,0; 2,4,5,6,7,8,A,B,C)7 8,9 67B n 6;AC0 n C (6,C; 1,2,5,7,8,9,A,B,0)Table 5: Properties of S(8) in design PTable 5 shows the bloks of S(8); the bloks and partial bloks in theirnests, and the pairs still needed in the ompletion to a design with theparameters of P : We use the same notation as in Table 4 for listing thetriples and pairs. Again eah blok of the dening set has power 2 andinuene 6, but now the strongbox onsists of only one blok, S(S(8)) = f6g:Here we have an example where, although power and inuene of bloksin eah dening set are the same, the nests in eah ase ontain six triples,and the pairs still needed for ompletion orrespond to the 18 edges ofK2;9;the strongboxes are of quite dierent sizes. In either ase however, knowingve of the six bloks of a smallest dening set gives us a 1 in 2 hane ofnding the orret design.Example 3Consider the 2-(11; 5; 2) design, unique to isomorphism. The quadratiresidues modulo 11 form a starter blok for the design Q; that is, Q =f1; 3; 4; 5; 9g is taken as the rst blok, and the remaining bloks formedby addition modulo 11. Letting A denote 10, we have 1 = Q; 2 = Q+ 1 =11
2456A; 3 = Q+ 2 = 35670 and so on, till 0 = Q+ A = 02348: This designis also symmetri and its smallest dening set has 5 bloks [?, ?℄.In a symmetri 2-(v; k; 2) design, the set of all the bloks whih do notontain some xed element form a dening set [?℄. In this partiular ase,any ve of the six suh bloks form a smallest dening set [?℄. We onsiderthe set C0 of bloks whih do not ontain the element 0, that is, the set ofbloks f1;2;4;5;6;Ag = C0:Table 6 shows what portions of the design an be ompleted from anyof the 15 sets of four bloks at a time whih an be hosen from C0: Forinstane, given any of the sets f1, 2, 4, 5g or f4, 5, 6, Ag or f1, 2, 6, Ag,ompletion fores one extra whole blok, 9, and six partial bloks, eah ofwhih ontains four elements. In the partial bloks, either 7 or 8 must beadded as shown to give a omplete blok, and hoosing 7 or 8 in any onease fores the rest of the design. Thus there are two possible ompletionsof the set f1, 2, 4, 5g: hoosing the rst option to omplete eah partialblok gives the original design; hoosing the seond option gives the designf1;2;4;5;9g [ f123A8; 35608; 49A08; 369A7; 15A07; 23407g:For eah smallest dening set ontained in C0; the power of eah blok is2 sine two ompletions are possible in eah ase; similarly sine six bloksare not fored in eah ompletion, the inuene of eah blok is 6. Thusknowing any four bloks of C0 gives us a 1 in 2 hane of nding the orretdesign.In this ase, we an regard the set C0 n fAg as a dening set S1; the setC0 n f6g as a dening set S2 and the set f1, 2, 4, 5g as either S1 n f6g orS2 n fAg: Then in our previous notation, N 0(S1;6) = N 0(S2;A) = 9; andN 00(S1;6) = N 00(S2;A) =f123A; 3560; 49A0; 369A; 15A0; 2340g [f3A7; 1A7; 237; 367; 507; 307; 9A7;A07; 407g [f3A8; 368; 9A8; 1A8; 508; A08; 238;308; 408g:Now regard the set f1, 2, 4, 5g as S1 n f6g: To nd the strongbox ofS1 = f1;2;4;5;6g; note that the only blok neither in the set S1, norfored by any of its 4-blok subsets, is the blok A; hene S(S1) = fAg:Similarly, S(S2) = f6g: 12
Given bloks N 0 Completions1, 2, 4, 5 9 123A[78℄, 3560[78℄, 49A0[78℄369A[87℄, 15A0[87℄, 2340[87℄4, 5, 6, A 1459[3A℄, 5670[3A℄, 2480[3A℄2456[A3℄, 1580[A3℄, 4790[A3℄1, 2, 6, A 2789[45℄, 3670[45℄, 18A0[45℄1678[54℄, 2380[54℄, 79A0[54℄1, 2, 4, 6 8 127A[39℄, 5670[39℄, 2480[39℄2578[93℄, 47A0[93℄, 1260[93℄1, 5, 6, A 456A[27℄, 3480[27℄, 1690[27℄3560[72℄, 49A0[72℄, 1468[72℄2, 4, 5, A 79A0[46℄, 1359[46℄, 2380[46℄389A[64℄, 3570[64℄, 1290[64℄1, 2, 4, A 3 3480[2A℄, 5789[2A℄, 1690[2A℄4790[A2℄, 3689[A2℄, 1580[A2℄1, 4, 5, 6 256A[14℄, 79A0[14℄, 2380[14℄2690[41℄, 237A[41℄, 58A0[41℄2, 5, 6, A 15A0[89℄, 1467[89℄, 2340[89℄1345[98℄, 47A0[98℄, 1260[98℄1, 2, 5, 6 0 1478[6A℄, 3570[6A℄, 1290[6A℄1580[A6℄, 4790[A6℄, 1237[A6℄1, 4, 5, A 3670[59℄, 246A[59℄, 18A0[59℄368A[95℄, 47A0[95℄, 1260[95℄2, 4, 6, A 3459[17℄, 2690[17℄, 58A0[17℄3560[71℄, 49A0[71℄, 2589[71℄1, 2, 5, A 7 58A0[13℄, 2690[13℄, 4678[13℄5670[31℄, 689A[31℄, 2480[31℄2, 4, 5, 6 18A0[25℄, 1349[25℄, 3670[25℄3480[52℄, 137A[52℄, 1690[52℄1, 4, 6, A 1290[68℄, 245A[68℄, 3570[68℄2579[86℄, 15A0[86℄, 2340[86℄Table 6: 2-(11; 5; 2) design ompletions from four bloks of C013
The other smallest dening set (up to isomorphism) of this design on-sists of any four bloks ontaining one partiular element, together with anyblok not ontaining it. We onsider here the dening set S5 = f1;2;3;4;5gin whih all the bloks exept 4 ontain the element 5. Table 7 shows in-formation orresponding to that of Table 6, for the bloks 1, 2, 3 and 5; infat, that for blok 3 repeats the rst line of the previous table so we neednot realulate N 00:Given bloks N 0 Completions2, 3, 4, 5 0 127A[30℄, 1459[30℄, 689A[30℄1269[03℄, 158A[03℄, 479A[03℄1, 3, 4, 5 6 2380[41℄, 79A0[41℄, 256A[41℄2690[14℄, 58A0[14℄, 237A[14℄1, 2, 4, 5 9 3560[78℄, 49A0[78℄, 123A[78℄15A0[87℄, 2340[87℄, 369A[87℄1, 2, 3, 4 A 1690[2A℄, 0348[2A℄, 5789[2A℄1580[A2℄, 4790[A2℄, 3689[A2℄Table 7: 2-(11; 5; 2) design ompletions from four bloks of S5Blok 4 behaves rather dierently: the set f1, 2, 3, 5g fores theadditional omplete blok 8 = N 0(S5;4); the two possible ompletions areeither the original design Q ontaining the bloksU = f3689A; 14678; 1237A; 479A0; 23480; 12690gor a new design Q0 ontaining the bloksU 0 = f12470; 239A0; 46890; 12368; 1679A; 3478Ag:This ordering shows the bloks in U and U 0 as disjoint pairs, but toalulate N 00 we need to look at intersetions. This time N 00 ontains nopartial bloks of size 4, but instead onsists of 30 triples:N 00(S5;4) =f39A; 689; 368; 69A; 38A; 147; 468; 168; 167; 478g [f127; 23A; 123; 17A; 37A; 470; 9A0; 490; 79A; 47Ag [f240; 230; 480; 238; 348; 120; 290; 690; 126; 169g:14
These triples form a partially balaned blok design, in whih eah pair ofelements hosen from the set f1, 2, 3, 4, 6, 7, 8, 9, A, 0g appearsin either four triples (for 15 pairs) or one triple (for the remaining 30 pairs).Again the power of eah blok in S5 is 2, and its inuene is 6, so asbefore, knowing four of the ve bloks of this dening set gives a 1 in 2hane of nding the orret design. The strongbox S(S5) = f7g: However,a 4-element subset of the blok 7 appears in eah of the nests of S5 forthe bloks 1, 2, 3 or 5, and ve 3-element subsets of 7 for the blok 4,suggesting, rst, that perhaps this strongbox is not partiularly seure and,seondly, that we should also onsider the use of partial bloks in a deningset.We note that, if we onsider the blok numbers as the elements of adual design, then the 66 sets of ve bloks whih are not dening sets ofthe design Q form a 4-(11; 5; 1) design.5. Further QuestionsThe examples disussed above have been hosen to illustrate the on-epts of nest, power, inuene and strongbox, but are far too small forpratial use. We are now investigating similar strutures in larger designs,with a view to determining their suitability for realisti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